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ABSTRACT
This paper compares the outwardly similar structural formalisms of Marc-
Antoine Laugier and Arthur Schopenhauer (who uses many of Laugier’s 
examples). Laugier purports to base his aesthetics on an historical 
argument from the “primitive hut”; but his preferences are really based 
on aversion to structurally and programmatically non-functional elements. 
His preferences show disregard for purely aesthetic considerations, such 
as pleasing proportions. Schopenhauer’s formalism is based on his 
cognitivist approach to aesthetics, according to which architecture is 
above all supposed to demonstrate relations between load and support, 
but in spite of this shows greater sensitivity to sensory beauty.
1. Introduction
Formalist theories of beauty emerge in aesthetic theory during the eighteenth 
century, where by formalism I mean the theory that spatial and/or tempo-
ral form in a natural object or a work of human art is that which triggers the 
pleasure that leads us to call the object beautiful, and thus that which properly 
constitutes the beauty of the object. An oft-quoted statement of formalism is 
found in the “Third Moment” of the “Analytic of the Beautiful” in Immanuel 
Kant’s 1790 Critique of the Power of Judgment, where Kant states that:
In painting and sculpture, indeed in all the visual [bildenden] arts, in architec-
ture and horticulture insofar as they are fine arts, the drawing is what is essen-
tial, in which what constitutes the ground of all arrangements for taste is now 
what gratifies in sensation but merely what pleases through its form. […] All 
form of the objects of the senses (of the outer as well as, mediately, the inner), 
is either shape or play: in the latter case, either play of shapes (in space, mime 
and dance), or mere play of sensations (in time). The charm of colors or of the 
agreeable tones of instruments can be added, but drawing in the former and 
composition in the latter constitute the proper object of the pure judgment of 
taste. (KU, AA 05: 225)
 But Kant was not the first to express such formalism.  Half a century earlier, 
the Scots-Irish philosopher Francis Hutcheson, who was an important influence 
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on Kant, especially in aesthetics, had attributed our pleasure in the “Absolute 
or Original Beauty” “perceiv’d from Works of Nature, artificial Forms, Figures” 
and even “Theorems” to “Figures […] in which there is Uniformity amidst Va-
riety,” indeed, “to speak in the Mathematical Style, […] in a compound Ratio 
of Uniformity and Variety: so that where the Uniformity of Bodies is equal, 
the Beauty is as the Variety; and where the Variety is equal, the Beauty is as 
the Uniformity.” (Hutcheson 2008: 17, 28–9)  In the case of animals, a pleasing 
ratio of uniformity amidst variety may consist in “a certain Proportion of the 
various Parts to each other, which still pleases the Sense of Spectators, tho they 
cannot calculate it with the Accuracy of a Statuary,” (Hutcheson 2008: 33)  and
As to the Works of Art, were we to run thro the various artificial Contrivances 
or Structures, we should constantly find the Foundation of the Beauty which 
appears in them, to be some kind of Uniformity, or Unity of Proportion among 
the Parts, and of each Part to the whole.  As there is a vast Diversity of Propor-
tions possible, and different Kinds of Uniformity, so there is room enough for 
the Diversity of Fancys observable in Architecture, Gardening, and such like 
Arts in different Nations; they all may have Uniformity, tho the parts in one 
may differ from those in another. (Hutcheson 2008: 41)
 Now, Hutcheson does not explain why unity amidst variety or proportion 
among parts and whole should be the source of our pleasure in beauty, or in 
his view the pleasure in the perceiver that literally constitutes the beauty that 
is improperly attributed to the object (Hutcheson 2008: 27); he is content with 
the empirical observation of a connection between pleasure and proportion 
that “would probably hold true for the most part, and might be confirm’d by 
the Judgment of Children in the simpler Figures,” (Hutcheson 2008: 30) or the 
“Experience” that “all Men are better pleas’d with Uniformity in the simpler In-
stances than the contrary, even when there is no Advantage observ’d attending 
to it.” (Hutcheson 2008: 63) Kant does attempt an explanation, namely that the 
perception of suitable forms triggers a “free play” of imagination and under-
standing, which pleases because it feels to us as if the ordinary goal of cognition, 
namely the union of the “manifold” or diversity of inputs or information pre-
sented to us, is being achieved, surprisingly, without the means that ordinarily 
guarantees this achievement, namely the application of a determinate concept 
of an object to this manifold.1 An important point about Hutcheson’s observa-
tion and Kant’s explanation is that neither turns on claims about the nature or 
goal of any particular form or medium of art; both are claims about the psy-
chology of the human response to forms or proportions, although Hutcheson 
would have been content with the (anachronistic) designation of his observa-
tions as claims within empirical psychology while Kant would have insisted (in 
my view implausibly) that his theory was part of “transcendental” psychology.
1  See Kant, Critique, Introductions, sections VI-VIII (KU, AA 055:187–91); §9 
(KU,05:217–19); General Remark following §22, (KU, AA 05:240–1); and §35 (KU, AA 
05:286–7). For commentary, see Guyer 1997: 60–105, and Guyer 2005.
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A second point to notice about these forms of formalism is that neither pre-
tends to be a complete account of our pleasure in works of art.  Both include 
architecture among the arts in which form pleases us, but neither claims that 
form is the only thing that pleases. Kant in particular recognizes, in time-hon-
ored tradition, that works of architecture, “such as a church, a palace, an arse-
nal, or a garden-house,” have different intended functions, and that our overall 
pleasure (or displeasure) in such a work is a complex response to both its form 
and function, or to a relation between them that may be that of compatibility 
or perhaps something more intimate (KU, AA05: 229–31). Further, Kant ar-
gues in his actual theory of fine art that all such art has intellectual meaning, 
or expresses what he calls an “aesthetic idea,” (KU, AA05: 313–19) and in his 
most extensive comment about architecture, where “a certain use of the artis-
tic object is the main thing,” or “the appropriateness of the product to a cer-
tain use is essential,” he also insists that architecture must satisfy the condi-
tion of expressing an aesthetic idea as well – although he is not explicit about 
what sorts of content the aesthetic ideas expressed by architecture might have 
(KU, AA05: 322). Even so, both Hutcheson and Kant recognize that a work of 
architecture can please us in a variety of ways, and although both hold that 
pleasing form is a necessary condition of our pleasure in a work of architec-
ture neither attempts to restrict or reduce our pleasure in architecture to plea-
sure in form alone.
The two theorists upon whom I want to focus here do exactly that, how-
ever, or at least try to do so.  These are Marc-Antoine Laugier (1713–1769) and 
Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), the first of whom published his Essay on 
Architecture in 1753 and the second of whom addressed architecture in the 
first edition of his magnum opus The World as Will and Representation in 1819 
and then expanded upon his treatment in the second edition of the work in 
1844.  Their approaches to architecture thus straddle the turn from the eigh-
teenth to the nineteenth centuries. It may not be common to link these two 
figures, although Schopenhauer’s examples suggest that he was familiar with 
Laugier; but whether or not he was, a comparison of them may be interesting. 
I will argue that Laugier is not very clear about the real reason for his advoca-
cy of formalism, but that his actual reason for it is above all functionalist, and 
that he then excludes all departures from functionalism for the sake of other 
potential pleasures in architecture, including the pleasure of pleasing forms 
and proportions. Schopenhauer has a different reason for his version of archi-
tectural formalism, one that is not connected to function, indeed it radically 
forswears considerations of function in genuine architectural pleasure, but is 
more closely connected although not identical to the intellectualist or cogni-
tivist element that Kant had brought out with his theory of aesthetic ideas. 
But even though this does not sit entirely easily with his theory, Schopenhau-
er makes more of a concession to the sheer pleasure of sensibility in form or 
proportion than does Laugier, and thus leaves more room for a less rigid ap-
proach to architectural pleasure than does his predecessor. Or so I will argue 
is the lesson of this comparison.
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2. Laugier
Laugier’s essay on architecture was published just seven years after Charles Bat-
teux’s The Fine Arts Reduced to a Single Principle (1746). Batteux’s single prin-
ciple was that beautiful art should imitate nature, although in fact he meant la 
belle nature, that is, not particular objects in nature as we actually find them, 
but idealized nature, which is more a product of human imagination guided 
by our experience of nature than mere reproduction of what we experience. 
Batteux’s paradigm for the arts was poetry, but he meant his thesis to apply to 
all the arts. He touches upon architecture only briefly, but meant his thesis to 
apply to this case as well. However, he applied the thesis to architecture in a 
surprising way.  First, like any Vitruvian, he considered architecture a “useful 
art,” and said that “In the useful arts, the decoration takes a useful turn; every-
thing must seem to serve our needs.” In other words, all other aspects of archi-
tecture must be compatible with, indeed subservient to, the work’s properly 
serving its intended function.  Thus we “demand […] a beauty that is actually 
useful.” That part of Batteux’s view is not surprising. What is surprising is his 
next statement, namely that “There are, however, occasions when . . . archi-
tecture may take flight.  This is when heroes are to be celebrated and temples 
built.  Then it is the responsibility” of architecture “to imitate the greatness of 
their subject and excite admiration.” (Batteux 2015: 23) It is not the appearance 
of objects in nature, such as a canopy of leafy branches, that is to be imitat-
ed, but something that cannot be seen at all, such as greatness, which is to be 
“imitated” by recreating the mood such greatness triggers, our emotional re-
sponse to greatness, by different means. A monument or temple does not im-
itate the appearance of a hero or god (even if the latter is thought of as having 
an appearance, as in primitive thought); emotions of admiration, or “grandeur, 
majesty, and elegance,” are produced by the very different means of powerful 
columns, lofty ceilings, and so on.
Laugier’s adoption of Batteux’s approach is complicated. He begins by 
seeming to take the thesis that art must imitate nature more literally than did 
Batteux himself, at least if we count early humans, their raw materials, and 
their first efforts as pretty much part of nature: Laugier’s thesis is that the es-
sential elements of architecture are those already found in the “primitive hut,” 
the conjectural earliest form of human building, and that any departure from 
the use of those earliest elements of building is a mistake that compromises 
architectural beauty. This seems to commit what philosophers call the “genetic 
fallacy,” that is, assuming that the original meaning or function of something 
must always remain its meaning or function; in our wisdom, we know that to 
be a fallacy from biology itself, for we know that evolution is constantly adapt-
ing structures that originally evolved for one purpose to different purposes in 
later organisms struggling to reproduce in different circumstances. Likewise, 
there are numerous cases in which it would be an error to insist that the current 
meaning of a word is determined by its meaning at some earlier period – just 
think about the English word “bank.” However, Laugier’s criticisms of various 
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departures from the structural logic of the primitive hut are not really moti-
vated by his original historical argument, but by his abhorrence of the mere-
ly decorative use of architectural elements without a proper function, that is, 
without reference to their proper current function, not necessarily their orig-
inal function. This comes closer to Batteux’s actual position about architec-
ture, namely that decoration must be subservient to utility. But then Laugier 
fails to follow Batteux on the further point that our pleasure in architecture 
can “take flight” and derive from more than mere utility. However, it is not just 
the further layer of emotional import attaching to such ideas as heroism and 
divinity that Laugier neglects, but also the possibility that we have aesthetic 
preferences for forms and proportions that may have to be balanced with our 
demands for utility and the appearance of utility.  Or to put it another way, 
Laugier’s version of formalism privileges the forms that serve structural and 
programmatic functionality over forms that might be found by experience to 
be aesthetically pleasing instead of arguing that these two kinds of form have 
to be balanced for maximally pleasing work.
Laugier’s allegiance to the general thesis that art should imitate nature is 
immediately evident: the first sentence of his first chapter is “It is the same in 
architecture as in all other arts: its principles are founded on simple nature, 
and nature’s process clearly indicates [art’s] rules.” (Laugier 1977: 11) His next 
sentence clearly indicates that he regards early man as part of nature: “Let us 
look at man in his primitive state without any aid or guidance other than his 
natural instincts.”2 Then, following the hoary precedent of Vitruvius (Vitru-
vius Pollio 1914: 38–9), he imagines that early humans, having discovered the 
limitations of the completely unimproved shelters that might be offered by 
forests and caves, and wanting to make shelters that would protect them with-
out burying them, figure out how to erect four sturdy fallen branches, lay four 
other branches across these naturally formed posts as equally natural beams, 
then used some more branches to erect two adjoining rows of rafters across 
which they could lay “leaves so closely packed that neither sun nor rain can 
penetrate,” and finally figured out to dress the sides of their hut to get further 
security from cold and heat (and perhaps prying eyes as well, Laugier 1977: 
11–2). Thus primitive humans, from natural needs and natural materials, in-
vented columns, beams, and pitched roofs that yielded triangular pediments 
by the inexorable laws of Euclidean geometry (not yet formulated by them, of 
course). Laugier’s thesis is then that it is only by continuing to use these ele-
ments for their original functions, and even when replacing wood with stone 
preserving the original appearance of the wooden members, that beauty in ar-
chitecture can be achieved. As he puts it,
Such is the course of simple nature; by imitating the natural process, art was 
born.  All the splendors of architecture ever conceived have been modeled on 
the little rustic hut I have just described.  It is by approaching the simplicity 
2  I will not attempt to update the gendered language of the eighteenth century.
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of this first model that fundamental mistakes are avoided and true perfection 
is achieved. […] From now on it is easy to distinguish between the parts which 
are essential to the composition of an architectural Order and those which have 
been introduced by necessity or have been added by caprice.  The parts that are 
essential are the cause of beauty, the parts introduced by necessity cause every 
license, the parts added by caprice cause every fault. (Laugier 1977: 12)
The essential parts are the columns, beams, and pediments; the parts in-
troduced by necessity are such things as walls and windows for different cli-
mates; and the parts introduced by caprice are any other decorations. The first 
are the source of beauty; the second always put beauty at risk; and the third 
always compromise beauty.  
This seems like a straightforward example of the genetic fallacy: because 
early humans had and needed only posts, beams, and roof-members, the beau-
ty of our buildings too can derive only from those elements, even if we have 
replaced wood with stone, and everything else risks or actually compromises 
beauty. “Any device – even if approved by great men – which is either con-
trary to nature or cannot be convincingly explained is a bad device and must 
be proscribed.” (Laugier 1977: 21) There is no possibility of adaptation or addi-
tion to what was originally necessary for a primitive hut to remain erect and to 
perform its function of sheltering. However, an examination of several exam-
ples of Laugier’s criticisms of subsequent architectural innovations that have 
departed from the primitive model suggests that he is not really objecting to 
the departure from history as such but to the current disfunctionality of such 
innovations, that is to the fact that they are necessary neither to the function 
of a building as shelter nor to helping the building maintain its functionality 
by keeping it erect. In Vitruvian terms, we could say that he is objecting to 
anything that is not necessary for utilitas or firmitas, making no room for any 
independent sources of venustas.
One example is Laugier’s objection to doubled pediments on the same fa-
cade or to pediments added along the long dimension of a pitched roof. The 
purpose of a pitched roof is to shed rain, pediments are the consequence of 
constructing a pitched roof with a single ridge to shed rain, and any other use 
of a pediment can only compromise the beauty of a building. Thus he claims 
that it is a “fault” “to erect the pediment on the long side of a roof,” as was 
done in “the design for the peristyle of the Louvre,” for “Since the pediment 
represents the gable of a roof, it must be placed so as to conform to the thing 
it represents,” a strict application of the principle of imitation.  Likewise it is 
a fault “to make pediments that are not triangular,” for since a roof that is in-
tended to shed rain must always “end in a more or less acute angle,” so “the 
pediment which is its representation must strictly imitate this shape.” And it 
is also a fault “to pile pediments on top of each other,” as at St. Gervais, for 
since a pediment always implies a roof, and it would be absurd to pile a second 
roof on top of a first, and “It is even worse when the pediment is placed under 
the entablature” when the roof must be above the entablature, this practice is 
“absurd.” (Laugier 1977: 26–7) The problems here are not that the proscribed 
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practices fail to imitate the practices of the ancients, but that they neither have 
nor represent any current function.  A pediment placed on the long side of a 
roof is not nor does not represent a roof that is necessary to shed rain (if any-
thing, the additional valleys created increase the probability of leaks); a sec-
ond pediment placed beneath the pediment belonging to the actual roof of 
a building is not part of a second roof necessary to shed rain. What Laugier 
objects to is not the departure from history but the departure from function.
The same is true in his criticisms of recent deployments of columns. He 
starts his discussions of columns with several principles. The first, that “The 
column must be strictly perpendicular, because, being intended to support the 
whole load, perfect verticality gives it its greatest strength,” insists on strict 
structural functionality. A second, that “The column must be freestanding so 
that its origin and purpose are expressed in a natural way,” insists that both 
origin and function must be clearly expressed by the architectural element. 
The remaining principles, that “The column must be round because nature 
makes nothing square,” “The column must be tapered from bottom to top in 
imitation of nature where this diminution is found in all plants,” and “The col-
umn must rest directly on the floor as the posts of the rustic hut rest direct-
ly on the ground,” assert that later buildings must imitate the natural materi-
als and methods of the primitive original builders. (Laugier 1977: 14) Keeping 
to these “simple and natural” principles is “the only road to beauty.” (Laugier 
1977: 19) Now, some of Laugier’s objections to later practices depend only on 
these principles; thus that even where walls are necessary columns should not 
be engaged but must be freestanding assumes that they must always express 
their original function and character of just holding up the entablature and roof 
(Laugier 1977: 15), and “Pilasters are only a poor representation of columns.” 
(Laugier 1977: 16) But other objections are that later innovations have no nec-
essary function, for example “The pilaster is a frivolous ornament” that does 
not do any work, especially when it is “even married to a column” that does. 
(Laugier 1977: 17) Likewise, it is absurd to raise columns on pedestals rather 
than resting them directly on the ground because the columns are the legs of 
the building, holding up the torso and the rest, and one pair of legs does not 
need to stand on another in order to do its job. (Laugier 1977: 20) Again, the 
problem is not really that the primitive hut did not have pilasters as well as 
columns or columns on pedestals; the problem is rather that pilasters do not 
have a structural function in the way that columns do, and it is not necessary 
to place columns on pedestals in order for them to hold up the parts of the 
building that rest upon them.
In all of these criticisms, Laugier seems simply to ignore that our pleasure 
in a building may depend upon aesthetic considerations as well as functional 
ones, in both the senses, structural and programmatic, of function. Thus, he 
seems simply not to consider that adding a properly proportioned pediment 
to the long side of a roof might be a pleasing way to break up what would oth-
erwise be monotonous and boring, a way to give the eye a place to rest or a di-
version as it traverses the long stretch of roof, which is presumably necessitated 
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by the length of the building, itself necessitated by its program. And he seems 
simply not to consider that placing columns on pedestals might be necessary 
to preserve the proportions of the column, that is, the ratio between its di-
ameter and its height, which have been proven to be pleasing over time. The 
case of columns is complicated: perhaps the favored proportions of the order 
of columns to be used could have been preserved without pedestals if the en-
tablature of the building had been lowered, but then the functionality of the 
building, the desired height of the interior floors, might have been compro-
mised; or perhaps the desired height of the floors could have been preserved if 
a different order of columns with its different ratio of height to diameter had 
been used, but that might not have been consistent with the desired mood to 
be created by the edifice. The point is that Laugier seems to be overlooking all 
of these perfectly plausible aesthetic considerations with his rigid insistence 
on the imitation and expression of the original character and function of these 
structural components.
Perhaps this criticism is too strong. Sometimes Laugier does criticize prac-
tice on aesthetic grounds, that is, simply on grounds of whether we like the way 
something looks, whether as a matter of nature or of nurture. Thus he objects 
not only that pedestals beneath columns are structurally unnecessary but also 
that “Nothing makes a building look more heavy and clumsy than these huge 
angular masses which serve as substructures to the columns,” as at the Hôtel 
Soubise, (Laugier 1977: 20) and he objects to a second pediment not only that 
it is structurally unnecessary but also “that the pediment cuts into the balus-
trade,” which is “awkward” and “a miserable way of joining them.” (Laugier 
1977: 26) What is miserable here seems not to be that the pediment cutting 
into it will make the balustrade structurally unsound, which Laugier does not 
suggest, but simply that it looks awkward.  (What is the function of the balus-
trade in the first place? to prevent roofers from sliding off the roof? or is that 
there as a nice-looking way of finishing the facade and making the transition 
to the roof?) However, although Laugier does appeal to these purely aesthet-
ic considerations, he does not admit that he is doing so. That is why I call his 
concession to aesthetic rather than historical and functional considerations 
grudging, at best.
The grudging character of Laugier’s concession to aesthetic considerations, 
or to put it more politely perhaps his severe subordination of such consider-
ations to his favored ones, can be confirmed by looking at his unacknowl-
edged revision of the Vitruvian triad. At least one way of understanding Vit-
ruvius’s insistence that buildings (at least public buildings) must be built with 
“due reference” to firmitas, utilitas, and venustas or beauty is that the factors 
of structural function, programmatic function, and purely aesthetic consid-
erations can all play a role in our pleasure or satisfaction in a building and 
need to be balanced with one another. (Vitruvius Pollio 1914: 17)  But Laugier 
replaces the third of these requirements, the aesthetic requirement of beauty 
for its own sake although compatible with the satisfaction of the other two: 
although without any explicit reference to Vitruvius, Laugier states that “One 
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must build with solidity, for convenience, and according to bienséance.” (Lau-
gier 1977: 68) “Solidity” is obviously Vitruvius’s firmitas, and under this rubric 
Laugier discusses “choice of materials and [their] efficient use.” (Laugier 1977: 
69) as of course Virtuvius does at length; “convenience” is obviously utilitas, 
and under this heading Laugier discusses “the situation, the planning, and the 
internal communications” or disposition of rooms, entrances, stairs, and so 
on in a building. (Laugier 1977: 81) But Laugier silently replaces Vitruvius’s re-
quirement of venustas with his own requirement of bienséance, which the trans-
lators leave untranslated but which could be translated with the term “good 
sense” which David Hume would use a few years later (Hume 1987[1757]), and 
which Laugier defines thus: 
Bienséance demands that a building is neither more nor less magnificent than is 
appropriate to its purpose, that is to say that the decoration of buildings should 
not be arbitrary, but must always be in relation to the rank and quality of those 
who live in them and conform to the objective envisaged. (Laugier 1977: 90)
This requirement of appropriateness between the appearance of a building 
and the station of those who are to inhabit it or the functions to be housed in 
it is a descendent of the concept of dignitas that Alberti added to the Vitru-
vian triad (Alberti 1988: 35), and can actually be considered part of the “con-
venience” of the building, that is, its suitability to its intended function. It is 
not the same as venustas or beauty. The only place where that seems to appear 
within Laugier’s version of the triad is in the passing remark in his discussion 
of solidity that “The great secret of true perfection of the art consists in joining 
solidity to délicatesse,” (Laugier 1977: 75) and here he is referring specifically 
to the desirability of limiting the thickness of walls as much as is compatible 
with their necessary strength in Gothic architecture. The “art” to which he is 
referring is the art of Gothic architecture, not architecture in general. Thus this 
remark does not seem to be a general recognition of the equal importance of 
venustas to that of firmitas and utilitas, and even if the remark were intended 
generally it would still place aesthetic considerations in a very subordinate po-
sition beneath the structural and programmatic functions that Laugier favors 
on his historical or pseudo-historical grounds.
3. Schopenhauer
Let us now jump ahead some decades and look at another formalist, although 
one who arrives at his formalism on quite different grounds from Laugier. 
Schopenhauer’s post-Kantian intellectual world is an altogether different one 
from Laugier’s, and his idiosyncratic approach to aesthetics adds to that dis-
tance and dictates a novel approach to architecture in particular. The most 
obvious difference is that Schopenhauer rejects utility as a goal of genuine ar-
chitecture altogether, thus departing radically from the Vitruvian paradigm 
that Laugier had merely modified. A brief review of Schopenhauer’s general 
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philosophy and aesthetics will show why he dismisses any concern with util-
ity on the part of genuine architecture and thus why his formalism must take 
a very different form from Laugier’s, which as we saw was based more on an 
assumption of the primacy of utility in architecture than on his stated thesis 
that successful architecture must imitate its own historical genesis.
For our purposes, the most relevant of Schopenhauer’s underlying philo-
sophical assumptions is that both the human will and reality in general are ir-
rational, in particular that human beings are doomed to unhappiness because 
of the nature of human desire: either our desires go unsatisfied, in which case 
of course we are unhappy, or they are satisfied, but we quickly become bored 
with their satisfaction and come up with new desires, which are either satisfied 
or not, in which case . . . ad infinitum. For Schopenhauer, there are only two 
ways out of this fate: either the ascetic attitude, in which, aided by the meta-
physical realization that our individuality and all its concerns are just mere 
appearance, we rise above all desire and its dissatisfaction, or the aesthetic at-
titude, in which, aided by the contemplation of beauty, we leave the realm of 
desire and its dissatisfaction aside at least temporarily. Turning to the details 
of aesthetic disengagement from desire, Schopenhauer proposes that the ex-
perience of beauty consists in the contemplation of essential forms of appear-
ance, which he calls Platonic Ideas, rather than the particulars of experience: 
since desire is always the desire of an individual in particular circumstances 
for something particular, contemplation of Platonic Ideas or universals is sup-
posed to release us, at least for a while, from concern for our desires and their 
satisfaction. In the experience of beauty “We lose ourselves entirely in [the] 
object […] we forget our individuality, our will, and continue to exist only as 
pure subject, as clear mirror of the object,” and if the object has “passed out of 
all relation to something outside it, and the subject has passed out of all rela-
tion to the will,” the locus of desire, then “what is thus known is no longer the 
individual thing as such, but the Idea […] at the same time the person who is 
involved in this perception is no longer an individual, for in such perception 
the individual has lost himself; he is pure will-less, painless, timeless, subject 
of knowledge.” (Schopenhauer 1958: 178–9[1]) Unlike the ascetic attitude, this 
aesthetic state of release is not enduring: “willing, desire, the recollection of 
our own personal aims, always tears us anew from peaceful contemplation”; but 
it is renewable: “yet again and again the next beautiful environment, in which 
pure, will-less knowledge presents itself to us, entices us away from willing.” 
(Schopenhauer 1958: 250[1]) In the case of artistic rather than natural beauty, 
the essential forms are wrested from the particularity of ordinary appearance 
by the exceptional cognitive power of the artist and also by the strength of will 
of the artist to rise, paradoxically, above the ordinary concerns of will – this is 
Schopenhauer’s reinterpretation of the eighteenth-century conception of ge-
nius (Schopenhauer 1958: 185–6[1]) – and the rest of us can benefit from the 
contemplation of the Platonic Idea presented by the artist.
Schopenhauer’s theory of aesthetic experience as merely a release from 
the pain of desire is an innovation in the history of aesthetics, for heretofore 
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the experience of beauty had always been described as a positive pleasure, not 
merely relief from antecedent pain – even the conception of pleasure in beauty 
as disinterested proposed by Hutcheson and Kant still posits a positive feeling 
of pleasure.3 Or at least Schopenhauer’s avowed theory of aesthetic pleasure as 
only relief from pain is an innovation. In fact, Schopenhauer recognizes that 
aesthetic pleasure can take two forms: “the source of aesthetic enjoyment will 
lie sometimes rather in the apprehension of the known ideas, sometimes rather 
in the bliss and peace of mind of pure knowledge free from all willing, and thus 
from all individuality that results therefrom.” (Schopenhauer 1958: 212[1]) Thus 
Schopenhauer does allow positive pleasure in knowing as well as the relief from 
pain that knowing is supposed to allow. This positive pleasure in knowing will 
play a role in Schopenhauer’s account of our pleasure in architecture. Further, 
we will see that Schopenhauer pays enough attention to the way buildings look 
to us to leave room for an element of sensory pleasure in architecture, some-
thing as we saw that Laugier almost entirely left out of his account.
Schopenhauer’s account of architecture immediately follows the section 
just quoted in which he recognizes the twofold nature of aesthetic pleasure. 
It begins with a further metaphysical premise, namely that the underlying re-
ality of all objects that appear to us, ourselves included, which he calls will in 
analogy with the human will, appears at different levels of “objectification,” 
ranging from the elementary force of gravity to animal and human behavior. 
At each level of objectification there are essential forms that can be captured 
in different Platonic Ideas, with the negative and positive effects already de-
scribed. Schopenhauer classifies the different arts on the basis of the different 
levels of objectification the Platonic ideas of which they present.  Architecture 
is the most basic of the arts because it presents Platonic Ideas of two of the 
most fundamental and universal forces of nature, namely gravity, along with 
cohesion and rigidity, and light (while tragedy and music are the highest of the 
arts for him because they present Platonic Ideas of the highest objectifications 
of the will in appearance, namely the human will in the case of tragedy and the 
will as such in music). If we consider architecture as a fine art then we must 
consider it “apart from its provision for useful purposes,” for in the latter ca-
pacity “it serves the will and not pure knowledge, and thus is no longer art in 
our sense,” for in serving the will it can ultimately always produce only pain, 
not pleasure. (Think about trying to keep your roof repaired!)  This is where 
Schopenhauer simply dismisses utility from the Vitruvian triad. Instead, as 
a fine art we can assign architecture “no purpose other than that of bringing 
to clearer perceptiveness some of those Ideas that are the lowest grade of the 
will’s objectivity”; “Such Ideas are gravity, cohesion, rigidity, hardness, those 
universal qualities of stone, those first, simplest, and dullest visibilities of the 
will, the fundamental bass-notes of nature; and along with these light, which 
3  The idea of a negative pleasure, that is, of pleasure merely as relief from pain, is in-
troduced by Edmund Burke, but only in his characterization of pleasure in the sublime, 
not in the beautiful; see Burke 2015: 31–2.
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is in many respects their opposite.” (Schopenhauer 1958: 214[1]) The point of 
architecture as an art and of every aspect of a structure is to make the nature 
of these basic forces and phenomena of nature apparent to us, so that by con-
templation of them we may enjoy the twofold pleasure of relief from the pains 
of our own individual wills but also of knowing for its own sake. Properly 
speaking, Schopenhauer claims, “the conflict between gravity and rigidity is 
the sole aesthetic material of architecture,” and the purest expression of this 
conflict is the structure of column and entablature, the weight of the entab-
lature pressing down on the column expressing the nature of gravity and the 
column resisting that weight expressing the nature of rigidity. Everything else 
in a building, particularly any concession to mere utility, risks distraction from 
this goal of achieving pleasure through cognition. Thus Schopenhauer writes:
Therefore the beauty of a building is certainly to be found in the evident and 
obvious suitability of every part, not to the outward arbitrary purpose of man 
(to this extent the work belongs to practical architecture), but directly to the 
stability of the whole.  The position, size, and form of every part must have so 
necessary a relation to this stability that if it were possible to remove some part, 
the whole would inevitably collapse.  For only by each part bearing as much 
as it conveniently can, and each being supported exactly where it ought to be 
and to exactly the necessary extent, does this play of opposites, this conflict 
between rigidity and gravity, that constitutes the life of the stone and the man-
ifestations of its will, unfold itself  in the most complete visibility. (Schopen-
hauer 1958: 215[1])
 Thus Schopenhauer arrives at a formalism similar to Laugier’s, but on an 
entirely different ground: whereas the earlier writer had argued explicitly 
from history and implicitly from an assumption about our pleasure in utility, 
Schopenhauer dismisses all consideration of utility from the pure aesthetics of 
architecture and instead celebrates what he takes to be the benefits of cogni-
tion of the purely structural function of the most elementary parts of building. 
Indeed, Schopenhauer uses Laugier’s examples of objectionable elements 
– he does not cite Laugier (or any other authority) but the examples strongly 
suggest that he knew the work of his predecessor. But the basis of his criticism 
is very different. He says that “The column is the simplest form of support, 
determined merely by the purpose or intention” – structural purpose, that is 
– while “The twisted column is tasteless; the four-corned pillar is in fact less 
simple than the round column, though it happens to be more easily made.”4 
But the reason is not that the primitive hut used only naturally grown, nei-
ther twisted nor square but round trunks as columns; it is rather the premise 
that “it is absolutely necessary for an understanding and aesthetic enjoyment 
4  Schopenhauer repeats his rejection of twisted columns and four corned pillars in 
the second edition addendum (Schopenhauer 1958: 412-13[2]). At p. 414 he explicitly re-
jects Vitruvius’s account of the primitive origins of architecture, which had been adopt-
ed by Laugier. This makes it even harder to believe that he was not borrowing from 
Laugier.
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of a work of architecture to have direct knowledge through perception of its 
matter as regards its weight, rigidity, and cohesion.” Schopenhauer’s cogni-
tivist approach also leads to an insistence upon truthfulness that can remind 
one of Ruskin’s “lamp of truth” in The Seven Lamps of Architecture, published 
just five years after Schopenhauer’s second edition, although surely without 
knowledge of it: Schopenhauer states that our pleasure in a work of architec-
ture “would be greatly diminished by the disclosure that the building materi-
al was pumice-stone, for then it would strike us as a kind of sham building,” 
as would a wooden building disguised to look like stone. (Schopenhauer 1958: 
215[1]) From Schopenhauer’s metaphysical point of view,of course, all of this – 
stone, gravity, rigidity – is mere appearance, not underlying reality; neverthe-
less, he insists upon truthfulness to appearance. He does not say why sham is 
inconsistent with the presentation of a Platonic Idea, but he assumes that it is.
Schopenhauer’s dismissal of any other kind of functionality than pure struc-
tural function is even more evident in the further chapter on architecture that 
he included in the second edition of his work. Here he writes:
In Italy even the simplest and plainest buildings make an aesthetic impression, 
but in Germany they do not; this is due mainly to the fact that in Italy the roofs 
are very flat. A high roof is neither support nor load, for its two halves mutual-
ly support each other, but the whole has no weight corresponding to its exten-
sion. It therefore presents to the eye an extended mass; this is wholly foreign 
to the aesthetic end, serves a merely useful purpose, and consequently disturbs 
the aesthetic, the theme of which is always support and load alone. (Schopen-
hauer 1958: 412[2])
 It is not that Schopenhauer does not know that peaked roofs serve to shed 
rain and snow, and may even look to us like they serve that function, or serve 
it well; it is rather that this functionality can never bring us even moderately 
enduring relief from pain (again, think about the inevitable leaks), and only by 
focusing us on the essential character of the elementary forces of gravity and 
cohesion, or load and support, can architecture as a fine art bring us its proper 
pleasure. Indeed, to take the argument a step further than Schopenhauer ac-
tually does, but which twentieth-century modernism would, in practice even 
if without benefit of adequate theory, we might as well build with flat roofs 
even in northern climes, because we are never going to get much satisfaction 
from merely shedding rain after all. But we can get the insight and enjoyment 
of insight from flat roofs that Schopenhauer promises.
At the outset of his discussion, Schopenhauer had also mentioned light as 
a fundamental objectification of the will, or force of nature as it appears to us, 
and this would seem to imply that works of architecture – at least some if not 
all – should also reveal the essence or Platonic Idea of light, contemplation of 
which could please us in its own right as well as releasing us from obsession 
with our own individual desires. But this is not exactly what he does with the 
theme of light.  He does say that “architecture is destined to reveal not only 
gravity and rigidity, but at the same time the nature of light, which is their very 
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opposite.” But he actually begins with a more fundamental and a more plau-
sible point. He writes:
Now architectural works have a quite special relation to light; in full sunshine 
with the blue sky as a background they gain a twofold beauty; and by moon-
light they again reveal quite a different effect. Therefore when a fine work of 
architecture is erected, special consideration is always given to the effects of 
light […] The reason for all this is to be found principally in the fact that only 
a bright strong illumination makes all the parts and their relations clearly visi-
ble. (Schopenhauer 1958: 216[1]) 
The proper use of light in architecture is to more fully reveal the structur-
al logic of load and support, not to present an independent Idea of light itself. 
However, when Schopenhauer says that in full sunshine against a bright blue 
sky architectural works gain a twofold beauty, he seems to be assuming that 
there is some form of beauty in architecture beyond the presentation of the 
Platonic Idea of load and support. Since he does not say that this is the pre-
sentation of the Platonic Idea of light, maybe it is just sensory pleasure itself, 
perhaps the warm glow of Sicilian sandstone in the temples at Agrigento.  
Perhaps Schopenhauer walks such a suggestion back when he continues 
the passage just quoted thus:
Hence this pleasure will consist preeminently in the fact that, at the sight of [a 
favorably illuminated] building, the beholder is emancipated from the kind of 
knowledge possessed by the individual, which serves the will and follows the 
principle of sufficient reason, and is raised to that of the pure, will-free subject 
of knowing. Thus it will consist in pure contemplation itself, freedom from all 
the suffering of will and of individuality. (Schopenhauer 1958: 216[1])
Or perhaps by using the term “preeminently” he means not to entirely walk 
back the previous suggestion; maybe he wants to argue that negative pleasure 
as release from pain is the primary pleasure of architecture, as of any other 
art, but that there is also room for a positive, purely sensory pleasure in some 
appearances, such as the warm glow of sunlight on stone, that is independent 
of all that.  
Schopenhauer does not return to the subject of light in the additional dis-
cussion of architecture in the second edition of The World as Will and Repre-
sentation, but he makes a few more comments that suggest that he does rec-
ognize a positive, sensory pleasure in the experience of architecture. Further 
discussing his thesis that the gravity and rigidity of stone entablatures and 
columns are “the proper aesthetic material of architecture,” he says that “such 
material requires large masses, in order to become visible, and indeed to be 
capable of being felt.  As was shown […] in the case of columns, the forms in 
architecture are primarily determined by the immediate structural purpose 
of each part.” But then he continues, “insofar as this leaves anything undeter-
mined, the law of the most perfect perceptibility, hence of the easiest com-
prehensibility, comes in. […] This comprehensibility, however, always results 
STUDIES AND ARTICLES │ 255
from the greatest regularity in the forms and the rationality of their propor-
tions.” (Schopenhauer 1958: 414–5[2]) Again he seems to be making two sepa-
rable points here: the primary pleasure of the experience of architecture is the 
negative pleasure that comes from the comprehension of the Platonic Ideas 
of gravity and rigidity, clearly presented; but there is a second pleasure, per-
haps secondary but real nonetheless, in perception as such, in this case in the 
perception of pleasing proportions. This impression is heightened a page later 
when he speaks of the potential grace of a work of architecture, demonstrated 
in a “good antique style of architecture in every part, whether pillar, column, 
arch, entablature, or door, window, staircase, or balcony, attain[ing] its end in 
the simplest and most direct way.” (Schopenhauer 1958: 415[2]) Here Schopen-
hauer seems to be going beyond necessary conditions for comprehending the 
Platonic Ideas of gravity and rigidity through the clear structure of entablature 
and column, and allowing that there are further perceptible qualities of works, 
such as grace, that are pleasing in their own right.
4. Conclusion
We have now seen two different theories that conclude with a similar em-
phasis upon structurally functional form as the essential element in architec-
tural beauty. Laugier started from his historical argument, but really seemed 
to be assuming that we are pleased with the appearance of functionality and 
displeased with whatever does not contribute directly to that appearance. 
Schopenhauer, by contrast, argued from his distinctive theory of the cognition 
of universals as the source of relief from the pain of ordinary existence that 
architecture should clearly reveal the fundamental forces of nature that are at 
work in it. We have also seen that while Laugier only tacitly allowed for an el-
ement of sheer sensory pleasure in architecture, Schopenhauer comes closer 
to explicitly acknowledging pure pleasure in perception, even though it com-
plicates his theory to do so.
What lesson should we draw from all this? I always favor a pluralistic ap-
proach to aesthetics, so my own preference is to exclude none of the accounts 
of pleasure mentioned from a legitimate role in our experience of architecture: 
we can enjoy the history of its own building or building more generally that 
we might be able to read in a building; we can enjoy the appearance that the 
elements of a building are well-suited to their structural functions, as indeed 
we can enjoy the appearance of the building as a whole as well-suited to its 
programmatic function or functions; we can enjoy other knowledge that we 
might gain from the experience of a building, whether it is scientific or meta-
physical knowledge as Schopenhauer supposes, or any other kind of knowl-
edge; and we can enjoy sheerly perceptual pleasures, such as the glow of stone 
in sunlight, grace in the design of individual features of a building and in their 
harmonious combination, and so on. Why limit ourselves to any one of these 
in the name of a theory?  
FORMALISM AROUND 1800: A GRUDGING CONCESSION TO AESTHETIC SENSIBILITY256 │ PAUL GUYER
References
Alberti, Leon Battista (1988), On the Art of Building in Ten Books, translated by Joseph 
Rykwert, Neil Leach, and Robert Tavernor. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Batteux, Charles (2015), The Fine Arts Reduced to a Single Principle, trans. by James 
O. Young. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burke, Edmund (2015), A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the 
Sublime and Beautiful, ed. Paul Guyer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Guyer, Paul (2005), “The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited,” in P. Guyer, Values of 
Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
pp. 201–221.
–. (1997), Kant and the Claims of Taste, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Hume, David (1987[1757]), “Of the Standard of Taste” (1757), in Essays Moral, 
Political, and Literary, edited by Eugene F. Miller, revised edition. Indianapolis: 
Liberty Fund, pp. 226–249.
Hutcheson, Francis (2008), An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and 
Virtue, edited by Wolfgang Leidhold, revised edition. Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund.
Kant, Immanuel (2000), Critique of the Power of Judgment, edited by Paul Guyer, 
translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Laugier, Marc-Antoine (1977), An Essay on Architecture, 2nd edition, trans. by 
Wolfgang and Anni Herrmann. Los Angeles: Hennessey & Ingalls. 
Schopenhauer, Arthur (1958), The World as Will and Representation, 2nd edition, 
translated by E. F. J. Payne. Indian Hills, Colorado: The Falcon Wing’s Press.
Vitruvius Pollio, Marcus (1914), The Ten Books of Architecture, trans. by Morris Hicky 
Morgan. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Pol Gajer
Formalizam oko 1800: škrti ustupak estetskoj senzibilnosti
Apstrakt
Ovaj članak poredi naizgled sličan strukturalni formalizam Mark-Antoan Ložijea i Artura Šo-
penhauera (koji je koristio mnoge Ložijeove primere). Ložije zasniva svoju estetiku na istorij-
skom argumentu polazeći od „primitivne kolibe“, ali njegove preferenciju su ipak zasnovane 
na averziji prema strukturalno i programski nefunkcionalnim elementima. One otkrivaju ne-
haj za razmatranja koja su čisto estetska, kao što su to proporcije koje izazivaju zadovoljstvo. 
Šopenhauerov formalizam zasniva se na njegovom kognitivističkom pristupu estetici prema 
kome bi arhitektura, pre svega, trebalo da demonstrira odnos između opterećenja i oslonca, 
ali uprkos tome pokazuje veću osetljivost za čulnu lepotu. 
Ključne reči: arhitektura, Mark-Antoan Ložije, Artur Šopenhauer, estetika, „primitivna 
koliba“
